Introduction
Techniques of control flow checking are widely used for supporting the reliability of computer systems. They can be applied in a system at various levels of abstraction (controller level, microprogram level, instruction level, application level, etc.) . A survey of these techniques can b e , found in [4]. The basic principle of control flow checking is to verify that the run-time execution of a system (controller or program) corresponds to the expected/specified behavior. The expected behavior is given by the control flow graph of the system. The verification is done as follows: A signature function is used to compress the sequence of instructions or states that is currently being executed; then, this signature is compared to a sta-0731-3071/96 $5.00 0 1996 IEEE Proceedings of tic signature stored in the self-checking system. Various signature schemes are proposed in the literature [20, 7, 16, 19, 6, 5, 171 and are mainly implemented in hardware. The most popular signature functions are the checksum and the polynomial division by means of a multiple input shift register (NISR) . In general, these techniques aim at improving one or more of the following parameters: error detection coverage, error detection latency, processor performance, memory overhead, and monitor complexity. In [4], Leveugle addresses the problem of designing controllers with a control flow checking ability that induces a low overhead in a silicon implementation. The idea is to assign codes to the states such that this assignment verifies an invariant property. This property is that all paths leading to any given state have the same signature. Leveugle applies this technique to control flow graphs called SC-graphs, which are the graphs satisfying this property. He gives a procedure for recognizing such graphs and introduces rules to recast a non SC-graph into an SC-graph.
In this paper, we exploit, in a more general context, the idea proposed by Leveugle to reduce the complexity of the checking. Our contribution is three-fold:
1. We introduce a novel and generic algebraic signature function that can be efficiently implemented both in hardware and software. 2 . We adapt the fault detection scheme proposed by
Leveugle to software applications and provide new and efficient algorithms for implementing it. 3. We formalize the problem of latency checking and show that it is NP-hard.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the previous work in this area. In Section 3, we introduce our new signature function and show that classical signature functions are a special case of the one we propose. In Section 4, we provide algebraic solutions to the problem of assigning values to states. We show that this approach is more efficient than exhaustive search and heuristic techniques used in [4, 21. Finally, in Section 5, we formalize the problem of latency and examine its relationship to the complexity of the checker. We show that the problem of optimizing the checking is NP-hard.
Related work
The problem of control flow checking in a finite state machine (FSM) has also been addressed by Robinson and Shen [13, 14] and Escherman [2] . In [13] , Robinson and Shen propose to replace the set of rules introduced by Leveugle (to transform a non SC-graph into an SCgraph) by efficient algorithms. Their technique, called graph repairing, is based on a state splitting operation. In [14] , they propose a technique for assigning codes to states that guarantees that two distinct states have distinct codes. This technique allows to deduce the value of the entering signature of a state using the value of the state code. It allows near-zero latency without guaranteeing it because of the correlation between the value of the state code and that of the signature. The drawback of this technique is that it may require that length of a state code be as long as 2 x log (number of states).
In [2], Escherman proposes a graph repairing technique based on cutting transitions. In his scheme, the state register is implemented using a multifunctional test register (e.g., BILBO [3]). This state register/pattern generator can be activated at run-time to generate the next state value while the output of the circuit is only constrained to satisfy the unique signature condition. Thus, signature checking is not achieved on the actual state path, which may affect the efficiency of the fault detection procedure.
While previous work has concentratmecl on the improvement of the technique introduced by Leveugle for the hardware implementation of FSMs, we provide a generalization of this technique that is applicable to both software and hardware implementations. Although our contribution does not add to the power of the techniques proposed in the literature for hardware implementations, it provides an efficient and novel solution to software applications, such ils control programs and communication protocols. Moreover, we show that some previously known results on MISR signatures can more easily be obtained with our polynomial-based formulation.
In fact, in this paper, we address, the problem of control flow checking in FSMs from a broader and more general perspective than before. Our approach is broad because the signature function is a generic algebraic function that can be efficiently implemented both in hardware and software. It is general, because we show that classical signature functions, such as checksum and MISR, are a special case of the function we propose.
The use of our technique in software applications yields a fault detection mechanism that is more efficient than the techniques usually used for this purpose. For instance, the imethods proposed in the literature for fault detection in communication protocols are generally based on a replication of the FSM of the protocol [la, 18, 11 . In contrast to this massive replication, the signature technique only requires an observer that is implemented a t 1 9 a one-dimensional table whose size is at most equal to the number of states in the FSM [ll, 101. Furthermore, a computation of the signature requires only one addition and one multiplication operations at each transition. An example of the use of this technique in a protocol application is shown in Appendix A.
A new signature scheme
The control floiw graph is generally described by an FSM. We assume that the FSM is already in the form of an SC-graph. To insure this property, one can use the algorithms introdluced by Robinson and Shen in [13] . In this section, after recalling some basic definitions [4], we introduce our signature function then show that three classical signature functions (namely: checksum, XOR, and MISR) are a special case of the one we propose.
In this paper, we adopt the following definitions: A simple example of an FSM is shown in Fig. 1 . S(Si, E ) = Sj.
The polynomial signature function
In [ll, lo] , we propose three different signature functions based on the evaluation of a polynomial derived from the path. The functions that we propose exhibit the following characteristics: (1) They are stepwise computable (using Horner algorithm).
(2) They are efficiently implementable (both in hardware and software). (3) They have a bounded aliasing probability. (4) They exhibit a structure suited for algebraic manipulations.
Full path signature. The f u l l path signature function utilizes the state and event information to compute the signature. Thus, the states and the events must be visible to the signature generator. Each state or event is assigned a value that is used for computing the signature. The signature is computed by evaluating the path polynomial at a point 2 0 . This procedure detects incorrect paths and is well-suited for developing and implementing self-checking programs. The polynomial associated with a full path P = (SO Eo 5'1 El . . . En-l S n ) is defined as follows:
where: si is the state value; ei is the event value; n is the length of the state path; and 2 is a number from the working Galois field F as discussed in Section 3.4. The full signature is defined as a function CP that associates a number with a path P : @(P) = PP(;co).
State signature. The state signature is computed using only the state values. This technique is used when the generator has access to the current state information. This signature can detect illegal state paths but cannot detect illegal event paths. The polynomial associated with a state path P= (SO 5' 1 . . . S n ) is defined as follows:
The state signature is: QState(P) = Pp(z0) Event signature. The event signature is computed using only the event values. This technique is used when the generator does not have access to the current state information but has access to that of the event. It is well-suited for detecting faults in communication protocols when the checker is an external observer [lo] .
In this case, the event values are the types of the frames that are exchanged during the execution of the protocol. The polynomial associated with an event path P= (Eo El . . . E n ) is defined as follows:
The event signature is: CPevent(P) = PP(ZO)
Aliasing probability
In [9], we prove that, when errors on bits are equally likely, the probability that two different sequences of states have the same signature is h. Furthermore, when those sequences differe in only one state, this probability is null.
Specialization of the polynomial signature
In this section, we show that the signatures computed by XOR'ing the state value, by checksum] and by MISR (with internal XOR) are in fact a special case of the signature function that we propose.
XOR signatures. When the working field is G F ( 2 k ) and 20 = 1, then the resulting signature is equivalent to a XOR signature function. MISR signatures. Signatures computed using internal XOR MISR circuits that have an irreducible compaction polynomial g(z), see Fig. 2 , are a special case of the signature function that we propose. The working field is an extension field GF(2"'). This field is generated by extending GF(2) using an irreducible polynomial g(z) of degree k. $0 is taken equal to 0 . . -010, which we denote as 2 E GF(2'). The compaction polynomial of the MISR circuit is in fact the extension polynomial g(z).
Checksum signatures. When working in the field

GF(p)
(
Figure 2. An internal XOR MISF1 circuit.
Let & , j be the content of register j .at step Ij and Ii?j the j t h bit of the ith input. Ii and Raj are considered as elements of the Galois field G F ( 2 k ) . The MISR equation is as follows:
Addition and multiplication are done in GF(2k) (i.e., + is equivalent to a XOR and x is a polynomial multiplication modulo the compaction polynomial g(z)). Thus,
This formulation shows that the MISR signature is a special case of the signature function that we propose in Section 3.1. Hence, the theory presented in this paper applies also to the classical MISR signadme. Moreover, it is simpler than the classical MISR formulation and, because of its polynomial representation, it lis better suited for algebraic manipulation.
Choice of z0
When computing the signature of a. path, the state (respectively, the event) values do not cover all t:he elementa of the working Gal& field. Consequently, the masking probability of the signature function may be sub-optimal. In order to obtain a good covering of the Galois field, one has to choose 20 as a primitive root of unity. In the signature, the sum of the terms covers all the possible values of the field thus, yielding uniformly distributed signature values. Theorem 1 For : # E R signatures, choosing EO as a primitive root of unity is equivalent to choosing a primitive compaction polynomial g(z) for the MISR circuit.
Proof: Elements of GF(2k) can be interpreted as polynomials of degrlee (k -l). Operations in this field are polynomial operations modulo the extension polynomial g(z). The element 2 of GF(2k) is then represented as the polynomialp(z) = z . Taking EO = 2 is a primitive root of unity in GF(2k) is equivalent to:
This means that g(z) does not divide any polynomial zd -1 where d < 2k -1, which is the definition of a primitive polynomial.
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Three assignment problems
In [4, 51, Leveugle defines the state assignment problem as the problem of computing one value per state such that all correct paths leading to a given state are equal. Using 'our signature function, this problem can be generalized to three assignments problems. In this section, we introduce these problems, show how to solve them algebraically, and illustrate by an example. The three assignments problems are listed below.
The state assignment problem. Given an FSM A = ( Q , C, 6 ) , fincl the values to be associated with the states such that the state signatures of all correct paths leading to a given state are equal.
This kind of problems arises in the design of selfchecking programs and controllers.
The event assignment problem. Given an FSM A = (Q,C,6), find the values to be associated with the events such that the event signatures of all correct paths leading to at given state are equal.
This problem is relevant for event-driven systems and for external detection of errors in communication protocols. 
Solving the assignment problems
In this section, we show how to solve the state assignment problem. Algorithms for solving the event assignment problem and the state-event assignment problem are similar to the one described below and can be found in [9] . The state assignment problem is solved in two steps: First, it is transformed into a set of linear equations; then, the system of linear equations is solved by matrix inversion. 
p t @ s t a t e ( P o ) = @ s t a t e ( P t ) ;
System t System u{epn} end where S-, the set of antecedents of S , denotes the set of states Si for which there exists a transition to S.
The first phase in the algorithm described above generates ISFI equations to guarantee that all paths leading to the initial state SO have the same signature. Since the initial state SO is assigned an arbitrary signature' 0, all paths leading to SO have a null signature. In the second phase, for every state S different from SO, the algorithm selects a state SI from S-and a path Po leading to S through 5' 1. Then, for every state S; preceding S , the algorithm generates an equation stating that the signature of a path P; leading to S through Si is equal to the signature of PO. In software implementations, the state codes can be chosen from a set of size much larger than IQ[. For instance, if the values of the free states are randomly chosen from a set2 of size 1QI2 (the values are coded over 2 x log(lQ1) bits), the probability of having the same code for two different states is less than k, [9] .
Thus, a probabilistic algorithm that randomly chooses the values of the free states will find a solution in IC rounds with probability 1 -2-k.
In hardware implementations, the state values have to be coded over a minimized number of bits. According to our formulation of the state assignment problem, the search is restricted only to the 21Q1 -IT] -1 free states, which yields a substantial reduction of the search space.
From the discussion above, it appears that solving the state assignment problem by using the algebraic properties of the signature function is more efficient than an exhaustive search carried over all the states of the FSM. It also appears that the checking operation of the FSM requires only a one-dimensional table instead of the two-dimensional one used for software applications modeled using an FSM [la, 18, 11. 
Example
Consider the FSM presented in Fig. 3 left. When applied to this FSM, Algorithm 1 yields the system of equations described below: (SI as2 as3 cs4 cs5 as6 b This one-dimemional table is smaller than the twoLet s be the state vector s21 "' "' "' "' s7' '" dimensional table ofstates and events used by a checker sg, ~10). The system in (3) becomes:
s t a t e ( S 1 a ) = qstate(SlbS8c) Q S t a t e ( S 1 u S~U S~C S~~S~~) = @ s t a t e ( S 1 b s e d ) @.tat,( SI U S 2 U S 3 e) = @stat e
that replicates the initial FSM.
A . S = O (4)
A being the matrix: In order to solve this problem, we decompose matrix A into two sub-matrices A1 and A2 such that AI is invertible. The states Sg, S7, S3,Sg and S 1 0 are chosen as the free states using the Algorithm 3 in Appendix B.
Checking optimization
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section, we address the problem of further reducing the size of the one-dimensional table while guaranteeing a given delay for error detection. The main idea can be summarized as follows. Let Qc be the set of states where the current signature is compared to the static signature of a state in the FSM. When Qc = Q, this signature checking operation is carried out at each state of the FSM. Thus, the size of the one-dimensional signature table is equal to the size of Qc. Restricting the checking operation to a subset of Q yields a reduction of the size of the table while introducing some latency for fault-detection. The faultdetection latency associated with a set Qc of states, see Section 5.1, is defined as the maximum number of transitions contained in a correct path of which at most the root is in Qc. Note that this problem is also of interest for the design of some high speed protocols that have to do periodically some state exchange [8] .
First, we introduce an efficient algorithm for computing the latency associated with a given set Qc. Then, we study the complexity of minimizing the size of Qc that guarantees a given latency and show that it is NP-hard.
Computing the fault-detection latency
We start with some formal definitions:
Induced graph. Given a graph G(V,E) and a set of vertices V' E V , the graph G'(V',E') induced by V' is defined as follows: Vv1,212 E V'; (w1,02) E E' 3 a path P inG I ( F i r s t ( P ) = q ) A (Last(P) = 212) A ( P -{ F i r s t ( P ) , Last(P)} n V' = 0). 
Minimizing the size of Qe
One interesting question is to study if it is possible to minimize the size of Qe that guarantees a given value L for the latency. For this purpose, we introduce the following optimization problem (MinQc) and the decision problem (LCDP) associated with it.
Minimizing QC (MinQc) . Given an integer L and a graph G ( V , E ) , find the smallest subset V' of V such that V' induces a graph G'(V' E V, E') of latency 1 less than or equal to L.
Latency Checking Decision Problem (LCDP). Gi-
ven an integer L , a graph G(V,E), and an integer V, , , 5 [VI, is there a set V' such that V' E V, IV'I 5 V,,,, and the latency of the graph G'(V',E') induced by V' is less than or equal to L?
In the following, we state some results related to the computational complexity of MinQc and of LCDP; then we outline the mathematical foundations of our claims. The detailed proofs can be found in [9] .
Lemma 1
The decision problem LCDP is in the class N P . Sketch of Proof: Any set V' that is a solution to the problem LCDP can be checked by verifying that the induced latency is less than or equal to L. This means that LCDP can be solved using a non-deterministic algorithm. Thus, the decision problem LCDP is in NP. Proof: The decision problem is both in the class of N P (see Lemma 1) and NP-hard (see Lemma 2), thus it is NP-complete.
0
Since we prove that the decision problem is NPcomplete, this implies that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the optimization problem unless P = N P . One way to address this difficult problem is to use a heuristic that reduces the size of Qc while ensuring a bounded latency L ; note that the size of Qc is not guaranteed to be minimal. Such a heuristic, which still need further refinement, can be based on the following steps:
1. First, since a cycle that has no vertex in Qc causes the latency to be infinite, it appears clearly that at least one vertex in each cycle should be chosen to be in Q C . This problem is also known to be difficult and a heuristic can be used for this purpose. 2. Then, starting from the set of vertices in Q c , the next step is to break all directed paths that have a length greater than the maximum latency acceptable. This can be done by identifying the vertices that are not in Qe and that are at a distance3 L from a vertex in Q c . These vertices4 are put in Qe. The process described in this step reiterates until no vertex in the graph is at a distance greater than L from a node in Q e . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced an efficient signature function based on polynomial evaluation. This signature function can be efficiently implemented in software. We showed that classical signature functions known in the literature (e.g., checksum, MIS ' R ) are a special case of the one we propose and that known results about these functions can be re-proven in a much simpler manner. We showed that the state assignment problem can be efficiently solved using an algebraic matrix inversion followed by a probabilistic algorithm for software applications or a reduced-space backtrack search for hardware implementations). Furthermore, we formalized the problem of optimizing the checking while ensuring a predefined latency. Finally, we studied to computational complexity of this problem and showed that it is NP-hard.
As hanging research issues, we propose the following improvements, which we are currently investigating:
0 Define and evaluate heuristics for solving the optimization problem.
0 State some of the criteria for the combinatorial optimization of the controller as equations to be solved algebraically.
In software implementation, it may become possible to accept, for some given states, IC valid signatures instead of the unique one envisaged in this paper. In this case, the techniques we presented become applicable to a larger class of FSMs.
Appendices
A. Protocol application
The detection of execution errors in communication protocols has been addressed in the literature [12, 18, 11, where it is assumed that errors appear as incorrect transitions. In [ll, lo] , we have shown that detecting execution errors in communication protocols can be achieved by checking the signature of the execution path. The signature checker can be either (1) internal to the protocol or (2) external.
1. In the first case, the full path signature is used because the checker has access to both the state and event information. 2. In the second case, the checker has only access to the event information, consequently only the event path signature can be used. 
B. Selection of free states
The following algorithm takes as input an FSM A and determines, ils output, the set of free states discussed in Section 4.1.. At each step, this algorithm selects an unconstrained state, then updates the set of states whose code (Fixed-code) or signature (Fixed-sgn), as a result of this decision, can no longer be freely chosen. The algorithm stlops when no state whose code can be freely chosen is left (i.e., Fixed-code = Q ) , and it has a time complexity of O( ITI); where IT1 denotes the number of transitions in the FSM and IQ1 the number of states. Note that IFree-states1 = 2lQl -IT1 -1.
When this algorithm is used in the case of FSMs implemented in hardware, the complexity overhead of the hardware can be reduced by making an appropriate choice of the next state to be included in the set Freestates. For instance, the next state can be chosen among those tha.t are adjacent to a state already in Free-states or they can be chosen from the set Q c . 
Algorithm
C . Proof of Lemma 2
For a given integer L , we show that it is possible to transform any instance of SSAT into an instance of the problem LCDP. Let C = { c l , . . . , cm} be a set of clauses on the boolean variables U = ( u 1 , . . . , u n } .
Each clause is formed of 3 literals and a literal is either a boolean variable ui or its negation F. For instance, c, = (ui V V G) is such a clause. The problem of SSAT is the following: "is it possible to assign values (i.e., 0 or 1) to all the variables ui such that at least one literal in each clause is true?". In order to prove that LCDP is NP-hard, one has to: define a mapping from an instance of a SSAT problem into an instance of the LCDP problem, prove that whenever the 3SAT instance can be satisfied, then the corresponding LCDP can be solved, and prove that if the LCDP is soluble, then an assignment can be found that satisfies all the clauses of the SSAT instance.
Reduction. We need to define a reduction from an instance of SSAT into an instance of LCDP. First, we apply the following procedure to build a graph G (Fig. 5 illustrates the steps of this procedure and Fig. 6 shows an example): Each cycle is composed of vertices vi, and viy as follows:
5The expressions "double-cycle associated with a variable" and "double-cycle associated with a literal" are used interchangeably. 
4.
The integer V,,, of the decision problem is taken equal to n t 2 m ; where n is the number of variables of the 3SAT instance and m the number of clauses.
Note that the size of the graph generated by this procedure is linear in (n, m).
Example.
responds to the following SSAT instance:
In Fig. 6 , we show the graph that corc = { ( Z i v U 2 v q) , ( U 1 v G v q) } Sketch of Proof: Below, we outline how the proof is constructed, the full proof can be found in [9] .
[5] Else ci2 , ci3
The size of V' is equal to n + 2m.
0 VI exists + the 3SAT instance is satisfiable.
The proof consists of showing th,at if there exists a set V' such that every path P of length L + 1 has at least one vertex (different firom his first endvertex) in V', then we can find an assignment that satisfies all the clauses of the 3SAT instance.
-In every double-cycle associated with a variable ui, { u u i , G } n V' # 0 otherwise the latency induced by the cycle vui , G:, vu, would be infinite.
-In every triangle, at least two vertices out of three are in VI.
Therefore IV'I 2 n -+ 2m, but IV'] 5 V, , , = n + 2m. Consequently, one and only one of vu, and O,, is in V'; and only two vertices of each triangle associated with a clause are in V'. We conclude that every variable is assigned one and only one boolean value and every clause is satisfied by the literal associated with the triangle which vertex is not in V'. 0
